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11.1 INTRODUCTION
‘One of the most important problems in forensic medicine’, write foren-
sic geneticists Angel Carracedo and Lourdes Prieto, ‘is the so-called “CSI 
effect”’ (Carracedo & Prieto 2018: 4). Their description of the threat 
posed by TV shows such as Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) to their dis-
cipline runs as follows: ‘[m]ost TV series present forensic evidence as 
infallible – one hundred percent reliable, with no margin for doubt – 
when reality is very different: the scientific validity of forensic tests is 
variable’ (ibid.). When looking at the communication of forensic sci-
ence, we therefore seem to be confronted with an interesting paradox. 
While researchers and policy makers tend to complain about public 
disinterest in science and see this as threatening its cultural authority, 
in the case of forensic science we encounter the exact opposite. It is 
the prominence of forensic science in popular culture which seems to 
have raised expectations to a degree which might actually have negative 
consequences for the use of this knowledge in the context of criminal 
investigations and in the judicial system.
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Indeed, forensic genetics, as a specialisation of genetics and forensic science, 
is communicated and negotiated in particular settings. On the one hand, its 
identity is generally negotiated in and structured by the physical and social 
space of the forensic genetics laboratory, a space that is important in the chain 
of custody for producing DNA evidence that can be used for police criminal 
investigation and in the courtroom. On the other hand, the results of forensic 
genetic science are always eventually communicated in the courtroom, which 
becomes ‘a theatre’ (Felt and Davies, in Chapter 3, referring to Jasanoff) in 
which evidence needs to be demonstrated in a manner legible to the common 
sense of judges and jurors. In recent decades, public understandings of foren-
sic genetics – publics including here also judges and police officers – have been 
understood as being strongly shaped by media representations in prominent 
TV series. As a consequence, forensic geneticists have had to reflect on the 
views of publics they encounter and to develop communication strategies to 
protect and defend their profession’s identity, including the provision of guid-
ance about ‘good communication’.
In the present chapter we explore forensic geneticists’ perceptions of how 
they carry out science communication to their specific publics in the criminal 
justice system. More particularly, we examine how forensic geneticists recon-
struct their self-conception and relations to their publics when performing 
the presentation of DNA evidence in court. The research questions guiding 
our investigations are the following: What are the particularities of com-
municating forensic genetics? How do forensic geneticists cope with these 
particularities? And how do imaginaries of publics shape forensic geneticists’ 
experiences of communication?
In what follows we will reflect on two strands of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) debates that inform our study. After presenting our material 
and the methods we use, we present our analysis along three lines and draw 
concluding remarks.
11.2 SCIENCE COMMUNICATION AS BOUNDARY-WORK: 
PROTECTING SCIENCE’S IDENTITY AND DELEGATING 
RESPONSIBILITIES
Science communication scholars have highlighted that STS can offer relevant 
perspectives to understand how science and publics are co-produced in science 
communication practices (Davies & Horst 2016: 204). Indeed, there is a quite 
large body of literature pointing to the fact that publics are not simply out there 
waiting to be informed about science, but are actively made through the precise 
settings and the spaces in which science communication happens (Felt & Fochler 
2010; Lezaun & Soneryd 2007). In this context it is also useful to consider the 
distinction introduced by Mike Michael (2009) between ‘publics-in-particular’ – 
namely specific, situated publics with identifiable stakes and interests – and 
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‘publics-in-general’, a rather undifferentiated vision of ‘people out there’. 
Thus, we have to consider that the criminal justice system, and in particular 
the courtroom, are specific spaces (see Chapter 3) in which forensic geneticists 
communicate about DNA evidence. This gives form to specific kinds of pub-
lics, and shapes the roles that can be taken on, how these are distributed, and 
the kinds of knowledge that can and need to be communicated.
We also suggest reading our case in the light of the dominant sense-making 
narratives used by science communication scholars and practitioners today, 
such as the so-called ‘deficit model’ (Davies & Horst 2016: 37–39; Irwin 
2014; McNeil 2013). The reference to the ‘deficit model’ usually serves as 
an established classification to describe certain ways of performing science 
communication (in particular one-way instead of two-way science communi-
cation; Davies & Horst 2016: 37–39). This model has been used instrumentally, 
in the sense that it serves as a justification to argue for increasing scientific 
literacy or for excluding lay publics from some types of decision making. The 
‘deficit model’ is thereby a manifestation of broader imaginations of what 
scientific governance should look like (Irwin & Wynne 1996). In this chapter 
we will explore an additional, quite different, notion of the ‘deficit model’, 
applied not only to publics, but also to science/scientists. For our particular 
case, we will argue that the deficit model, as applied to science within forensic 
geneticists’ discussions about science communication, serves as a gateway to 
renegotiate the responsibilities within forensic genetics and the use of forensic 
genetics’ findings beyond its own communities.
Approaching science communication as relational and emergent also means 
paying attention to how imaginaries of publics prefigure science communi-
cation practices and to the role that communication plays in performing 
boundary-work (Gieryn 1983). Such boundary-work contributes on the one 
hand to maintaining the authority, credibility, and integrity of a specific sci-
entific community (Jasanoff 1993, 2004), but on the other hand it also allows 
the performance of specific distributions of duties and responsibilities. As we 
will show, in this case, science is framed as being responsible for demonstrat-
ing the reliability and veracity of research results, while those who apply the 
results in the criminal justice system are presented as being responsible for the 
appropriate use of these results.
11.3 DNA DOESN’T SPEAK – PEOPLE DO: 
COMMUNICATING DNA EVIDENCE IN THE  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Particularly significant characteristics of forensic genetics derive from its 
specific epistemic culture (Cole 2013), which is distinct from other forensic 
science cultures as well as from science in general, and which impacts upon 
the particularities of communicating it. Forensic genetics differs from other 
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forensic sciences by being celebrated as the ‘gold standard’ (Lynch 2003) 
among forensic sciences, suggesting a higher level of certainty and reliability 
due to its quantifiable estimations. Another important distinction comes from 
the type of work undertaken by forensic geneticists: these professionals tend 
to produce a specific type of scientific knowledge, designed to contribute to 
the investigation of a single criminal incident, and specifically to aid con-
victions or exonerations. Forensic genetic science’s temporally limited nature 
within legal truth-finding processes thus comes from the specificity of knowl-
edge claims and data produced (Cole 2013: 39).
Most relevant, in terms of impact on the particularities of communicating 
forensic genetics, is forensic geneticists’ specific target audience, comprising 
police officers, prosecutors, judges, jurors – the so-called ‘law-set’ (Edmond 
2001). The members of the criminal justice system that we will regard as 
forensic geneticists’ publics-in-particular (Michael 2009) are specific and situ-
ated publics with identifiable stakes and interests in specific aspects of DNA 
evidence, which in turn helps them to fulfil their duties. By contrast, publics-
in-general (Michael 2009) – or ‘wider publics’ as they are often referred to – are 
for most forensic geneticists an undifferentiated mass, who largely take their 
knowledge of forensic genetics from TV media.
One other particularity of communicating forensic genetics relates to how 
courts have emerged as democratising agents in disputes over the control and 
deployment of new DNA technologies, thereby advancing and sustaining a 
public dialogue about the limits of forensic genetics’ expertise (Jasanoff 1995; 
Lynch & Jasanoff 1998). Following the work of Michael Lynch and Sheila 
Jasanoff on that topic, a growing body of literature has addressed how the 
field of forensic genetics evolved and has been constructed through a com-
plex series of practices and procedures that functioned to close down initial 
controversies and to guarantee the credibility and reliability of forensic DNA 
evidence in criminal justice systems worldwide (Aronson 2007; Derksen 2003; 
Lazer 2004; Lynch et al. 2008).
Although foundational controversies involving DNA evidence have been 
resolved, standardisation and legal acceptance does not mean the end of con-
troversies surrounding the uses and interpretation of DNA evidence in court. 
Within the forensic genetics community, negotiations about diverse issues 
involving the uses and interpretation of DNA evidence mean that there is 
a continual need to seek common agreements in order to stabilise the field. 
Among these issues is a lack of protocol for dealing with diverse forms of 
reporting DNA evidence to non-experts (such as those found in courtrooms; 
Howes et al. 2014), and the challenges of communicating probabilistic results 
and likelihood ratios in typical identification cases (Amorim et al. 2016). 
Finally, the interpretation of complex DNA profiles, such as partial or mixed 
profiles, is also portrayed as being notably prone to reporting inconsistencies 
due to subjective decisions about whether a result is probative or inconclusive 
(Gill et al. 2008).
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STS literature on forensic genetics has also explored one other important 
dimension affecting the communication of DNA evidence in the criminal 
justice system: the so-called ‘CSI effect’, a concept employed by scholars, and 
increasingly also by practitioners and public media, to capture the assumption 
that members of the criminal justice system, and the public-in-general, con-
fuse the idealised portrayal of DNA evidence on television with the actual 
capabilities of forensic genetics in the criminal justice system (Cole & Dioso-
Villa 2009; Kruse 2010; Podlas 2009). The CSI effect, together with a lack of 
literacy on the probabilistic framework involved in the interpretation of DNA 
evidence, is considered by many forensic geneticists to be the major obstacle 
in their task of communicating the results of DNA analysis to members of the 
criminal justice system (Amorim 2012; Amorim et al. 2016). Although there 
is no consensus in social science studies about whether or not a CSI effect 
really does exist and what exactly it would consist of (see Ley et al. 2010), as 
we will show it is nevertheless an important element of forensic geneticists’ 
narratives about the challenges of communicating forensic genetics analysis 
in courtrooms.
11.4 METHODS
This chapter draws on qualitative data derived from nine interviews conducted 
with forensic geneticists who work in forensic laboratories and/or univer-
sity departments of forensic sciences based in different countries in Europe. 
Taking into consideration the diversity of the forensic genetics community 
(Cole 2013; Lynch et al. 2008), we adopted the following selection criteria to 
recruit participants in this study: they needed to hold a degree in disciplines 
directly connected to forensic genetics (Biology, Genetics and Medicine) and 
be the head of or employed by a forensic laboratory that provides DNA analy-
sis for presentation as evidence in criminal cases. In line with Cole’s proposal, 
our sample therefore aggregates forensic genetic scientists and research scientists 
(Cole 2013). Although the interview sample is small, for the purpose of point-
ing at the diverse argumentative repertoires that are the core interest of this 
chapter the diversity was large enough.
Recruitment was conducted by sending an invitation letter by email. Prior 
to the interviews, all the interviewees signed a written informed consent form 
and agreed to be audio-recorded. All the interviews were digitally recorded, 
transcribed verbatim, and anonymised. The script for the interviews covered 
the following themes: views and experiences of the expansion of criminal 
forensic DNA databases in different European jurisdictions, and of the trans-
national exchange of DNA data; opinions about the challenges of the uses of 
DNA technologies in the criminal justice system; perceptions on DNA tech-
nology development and innovation; and opinions about ethical issues and 
public engagement with forensic genetics.
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In order to avoid narrow framings of ‘science communication’ and ‘public’, 
for analysis purposes we use terms such as ‘public(s)’ but also others which 
appear to be used synonymously, such as ‘citizens’, ‘collectives’, ‘lay groups’, 
‘communities’, ‘society’, or ‘people’. Relevant quotations pertaining to the 
communication of DNA evidence were coded and subjected to multiple read-
ings to develop in-depth understandings of prevalent notions of forensic 
genetic science communication and the relations between forensic genet-
ics and society. These quotations were systematically compared, contrasted, 
synthesised, and coded by theme and by thematic category following the 
principles of grounded theory (Charmaz 2006), and interpreted using a quali-
tative content analysis approach (Mayring 2004).
11.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
11.5.1 The CSI effect and the ‘threat’ of  
enthusiastic publics
The particularities of communicating forensic genetics are understood by 
forensic geneticists as being shaped by the CSI effect and media coverage of 
high-profile cases, which they perceive as responsible for publics’ beliefs in 
the alleged ‘superior role’ of DNA evidence (Lynch et al. 2008). This CSI effect 
is framed as having two interrelated consequences on publics. On the one 
hand, it has helped to foster public interest in forensic genetics, and to make 
citizens aware of the existence and evolution of DNA technologies. On the 
other hand, it disseminates exaggerated understandings of the alleged power 
of DNA to solve criminal cases. One of our interviewees explains this juxtapo-
sition of implications:
The CSI effect has been significant, and the positive side of it is how young people 
have grown to be much more curious about the field. … That’s the good thing. 
The downside to CSI [effect] is presenting the tests as infallible, [as if it] always 
works…. [C01]
Forensic geneticists thus accuse the media of providing an incomplete picture 
of DNA technologies. By exaggerating the possibilities, the speed, and the cer-
tainty of outcomes of DNA technologies, media narratives do not provide an 
adequate description of inherent limitations of genetic evidence: ‘There is this 
famous CSI thing. But they [the publics] are not really educated about the pit-
falls and limitations [of DNA evidence]’ [O01]. Entertainment media narratives 
are represented as focusing on dramatic and emotionalised events in the por-
trayal of fictionalised representations of forensic science (Machado & Santos 
2011), standing in direct contrast to the efforts of accurately communicat-
ing ‘sound science’ (Hansen 2016). The emphasis on uncertainties in foren-
sic geneticists’ explanation of DNA evidence is framed as incompatible with 
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mainstream forms of communication. As such, as noted by the following 
interviewee, forensic geneticists struggle with media representations of DNA 
evidence, which are portrayed as being assured facts:
[The main challenge of communicating science is] the information that people 
receive from television programs and the media and the sort of impression that 
science is about certainty: ‘scientist says this and therefore it must be true’ and, 
in fact, science is full of uncertainties. People do not understand that, they do not 
appreciate it. … Uncertainties do not make good … audience. [D09]
Consequently, forensic geneticists tend to portray their publics as overly 
‘enthusiastic’ and as holding what they perceive to be unrealistic views about 
the possibilities of DNA technologies in criminal justice systems. However, 
these inflated perspectives on the potential contributions of DNA analysis to 
criminal investigation processes are not only present in forensic geneticists’ 
views of lay publics, but also in framings of the publics-in-particular that are 
active members of the criminal justice system. Several of our interviewees 
outlined how police officers, prosecutors, and judges also attribute too much 
importance to DNA technologies when addressing criminal cases. In their 
opinion, DNA is generally considered to be ‘a sort of priority type of evidence’ 
[E01] which plays a decisive role in how criminal cases are presented in court:
This public perception is that if you have the DNA, that’s it! That’s all you need! 
And if you don’t have the DNA, we’ll have prosecutors [saying] ‘You can’t make a 
case with this, with no DNA!’ [laughs]. [E01]
Not being immune to representations that portray DNA as infallible, stake-
holders directly involved in the criminal justice system are thus perceived as 
being strongly influenced by overly bright prospects fostered by the entertain-
ment media: ‘The CSI effect is a very common phenomenon, and therefore it 
shapes police officers’ expectations about what is possible’ [C04].
This poses several challenges to an adequate use of forensic genetic sci-
ence in criminal investigations. Members of the criminal justice system are 
described as not being very well informed about the kind of information that 
can(not) be obtained from DNA technologies, and under what conditions 
such information can be retrieved. As a consequence, forensic geneticists 
often describe how they are confronted with frustration and disappointment 
on the part of members of the criminal justice system when they are unable 
to provide clear results – namely, a match or non-match – on the basis of a 
DNA profile:
It is so popular the perception that it [DNA] is infallible and there is a fairly sub-
stantial lack of scientific education in most inspectors who work with DNA. … 
They will have either questions or issues with the results. … You get back a mixed 
result, or a negative result, and they say ‘We sent you a DNA analysis, so where is 
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my result?’ and we say ‘Well, this is why we couldn’t get a result’, and they can’t 
understand that. [E01]
The repercussions of overly positive expectations about the possibilities of 
DNA technologies are wide-ranging. A major concern, in the view of forensic 
geneticists, is that ‘misrepresentations’ might lead to miscarriages of justice, 
especially in cases where DNA technologies play a relevant role in delibera-
tions in court. Forensic geneticists also voice their dissatisfaction with judges 
when the latter ignore the potential risks and the unintended consequences of 
overstating DNA evidence. One interviewee would put it as follows:
Evidently, it [DNA evidence] is given much more importance by judges than it 
should. They must be aware that it’s a clear mistake, they should be much more 
careful. … Do judges know that 30% of incorrect rulings are linked to wrong iden-
tification of testimonies? Do judges know the real value behind each specific piece 
of scientific forensic evidence? They don’t. And they make a barbaric number of 
mistakes because of that. [C05]
By pointing to a lack of knowledge among members of the criminal justice 
system and to the need to tackle their ‘misconceptions’, forensic geneticists 
engage in a standard ‘deficit model’ narrative. At the same time, they under-
line that this is a serious issue that touches on the shared responsibilities of 
members of the criminal justice system. Such a lack of awareness has poten-
tially serious consequences, such as a possible miscarriage of justice. According 
to this view, one of the key types of DNA-related errors therefore results from 
misunderstanding the ‘real value’ of DNA evidence in court settings, rather 
than from errors that occur in the process of DNA analysis in the lab. Such 
a position also performs important boundary-work focused on constructing 
distinctions between the tasks of different professional groups in making use 
of DNA analysis: carrying out an analysis in the lab is the responsibility of 
forensic geneticists, while its final interpretation is the responsibility of judges 
in courts (Machado & Granja 2018). According to forensic geneticists’ views, 
the final (and therefore decisive) instance of interpretation of the evidence in 
order to reach a decision about guilt or innocence must be enacted by judges. 
As the following quotation illustrates, from such a perspective, forensic genet-
icists see their role as presenting and explaining DNA evidence, while also 
outlining the ambiguity involved in its interpretation:
I think that sometimes the expectation of the court [is] that they are going to be 
provided with some unambiguous scientific evidence of fact that is just going to 
allow them to come to the right conclusion in terms of guilt or innocence. I think 
there is a general difference in the perspective of the scientist, who will say: ‘Well, 
we found this profile and it is up to the court to decide what its significance is, 
particularly in regard to the guilt or innocence of the accused person’. [D11]
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Forensic geneticists represent themselves as confronted by publics-in-particular 
that they feel have too strong expectations of DNA evidence, namely that 
it should provide a ‘result’ that forms a clear basis for deciding whether the 
accused is ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’. Members of the criminal justice system are 
regarded as having a specific ‘deficit’: one of being overly optimistic about 
the capacity of DNA analysis, which is seen as synonymous with their lack 
of scientific literacy for understanding the ‘real value’ and the probabilistic 
framework of DNA evidence. These forensic geneticists clearly subscribe to a 
‘deficit model’, and with it to a particular vision of the publics-in-particular 
they encounter in the criminal justice system. This vision is instrumental in 
the sense that it reifies the boundary between the worlds of science and of 
non-science. On the one hand, their use of this ‘deficit model’ stabilises foren-
sic genetics’ authority over understanding DNA evidence; on the other hand, 
it constructs an enthusiastic, yet ignorant, public who have idealised views of 
DNA evidence, and thus who could potentially become a threat to the cred-
ibility of forensic genetics’ epistemic authority (Marris 2015).
11.5.2 Boundary-work along ‘deficits’: Establishing  
risk communication to delegate responsibility
In order to cope with the particular challenges of communicating their work, 
forensic geneticists develop coping strategies within their epistemic community, 
strategies which attempt to counterbalance excessive expectations towards DNA 
technologies. Among these is the emergence of what can be called a ‘proactive 
ethos of public responsibility’ (Bliss 2012: 166–172; Machado & Granja, 2018). 
This means that they aim to perform (forensic genetic) science in a way that 
is committed to and engaged with its wider social implications and the ways 
that its results are taken up in different arenas. One of the dimensions of this 
ethos is active communication of the limitations associated with DNA analysis 
within the criminal justice system, therefore deconstructing dominant visions 
that associate forensic science with a ‘truth machine’ (Lynch et al. 2008) that is 
able to provide certainty with regard to results. The adoption of such an idiom 
of uncertainty, one that addresses and attempts to manage the risks and uncer-
tainties underlying forensic science, seems to have become part of the epistemic 
culture of forensic geneticists, as illustrated by the following quotation:
So, it is a question of trying to give as much genetic data as we can, but at the 
same time not offering a service that makes exaggerated claims about the accu-
racy or the precision of the tests from very small amounts of DNA. So, I think it is 
important that we are realistic about the limitations. [C04]
Here we can detect a type of boundary-work that frames the identity of 
‘responsible’ forensic genetics experts as characterised by a felt need to reflect 
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on and clearly communicate the limitations of the evidence they can pro-
vide. Therefore, as a response to the high expectations present in the public 
arena, science communication is often preoccupied with caution concerning 
what forensic genetics cannot provide. Against the high expectations of its 
publics, the propagated approach for science communication here emphasises 
the responsibility for fully disclosing the limits and uncertainties, for example 
the deficits inherent to ‘their science’. This is a new twist in applying a ‘defi-
cit model’, this time to science (and scientists’ responsibilities to cope with 
science’s deficits).
A certain degree of formalisation and standardisation of such ‘risk commu-
nication’ has been established in protocols for using quantitative probabilistic 
value descriptions for reporting the results of DNA analysis when reaching out 
to members of the criminal justice system. Although being transparent about 
the limitations and risks of DNA results has become a routine part of report-
ing, it remains essential to make a distinction from ‘messy’ laboratory practices 
and to maintain the appearance of technical order (Lynch 2002) in producing 
evidence. The need to communicate that the uncertainties of DNA evidence 
are tamed and under control therefore also derives from the need to protect 
the epistemic community’s credibility from becoming ‘fodder for impeach-
ment’ (Cole 2013: 41) when exposed to potential fallibility. More recently, 
additional strategies for addressing such transparency-oriented approaches 
to risk communication have emerged. Some examples of this trend include 
providing concrete models for good practice for evaluative expert reporting 
and suggesting standards for evaluative reporting within professional net-
works, such as the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) 
(Biedermann et al. 2017). According to several forensic geneticists, this type 
of risk communication is increasingly important as more sensitive methods of 
DNA analysis are being developed and, as a consequence, sensitivity to issues 
such as contamination has also risen (Gill et al. 2008). Some participants in 
our study therefore advocate the adoption of an even more careful strategy of 
interpretation and communication:
Now we are getting weak profiles, partial profiles, from contact stains, there may 
be secondary transfer, and all of these other things, and this also has to be taken 
into consideration for the interpretation of the evidence. And the awareness of 
this situation is not very widespread. This is something that we need to promote 
and to make public, that there are limits of testing that … we are victims of our 
own success. … Because we have made it [DNA technologies] very sensitive, and 
now we have to live with the consequences. [O01]
Although some forensic geneticists might be committed to communicating 
the limitations and uncertainties of DNA analysis, judges and other mem-
bers of the criminal justice system might not be willing to interpret, under-
stand, engage with, or even accept such ‘uncertain’ premises. However, in 
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the end, forensic geneticists partly delegate responsibility for managing the 
difficulties of interpreting DNA evidence to members of the criminal justice 
system. These types of tensions therefore illustrate the boundaries and ten-
sions between the rationalities that guide the different epistemic cultures at 
work – those of science and the criminal justice system. This was addressed in 
the following quote:
In order to be successful in this interplay, of course we have the right to try to 
explain [DNA evidence], but the other guys, judges and lawyers, also have the 
duty of trying to understand. And unfortunately, as the society is organized, they 
prefer not to. Because the judges, most of them … prefer that the DNA speaks 
for itself, they do not realise that they are deciding. And they go mad when I 
resist their pressing on me to state a probability or something like that. Which is 
misunderstanding everything I am trying to do. [N01]
In adopting risk communication strategies anchored to policies of transpar-
ency, forensic geneticists thus attempt to leave the ‘black box’ of forensic 
evidence deliberately open, leaving uncertainty and the limitations of DNA 
technologies visible (Amorim 2012). However, this creates friction in as much 
as the intent of the criminal justice system – especially in decision-making 
spaces such as the courts – is to search for factual certainty in order to ensure 
that justice is done in each individual case (Jasanoff 2006), while the science 
system is quite used to handling a reasonable degree of uncertainty and error.
Besides delegating responsibility for interpreting DNA evidence to members 
of the criminal justice system, forensic geneticists also enact other kinds of 
boundary-work by defining what makes a good scientist (Machado & Granja 
2018) – that is, the one who communicates limitations – and delineating 
those who don’t accept the same norms. Such individuals are framed as what 
Jasanoff (1993: 78) has called ‘misfits, deviants, charlatans, or outsiders’ to the 
enterprise of science. Several forensic geneticists demonstrate this pattern of 
othering ‘bad behaviour’, that is, attributing certain behaviours to colleagues 
who are seen as less committed to these norms of humility when it comes to 
the capacity of producing evidence with certainty. They are quite sceptical, 
doubting whether other colleagues stick to the ideal of communicating the 
limitations of DNA evidence:
When I am testifying in court I always try also to make clear where the limits of 
this evidence are. … But I am not quite sure about my other colleagues. … So basi-
cally, my impression is that there may be cases … where the DNA was overstated, 
already in the report; there was no quality check because there was nobody in 
the court asking questions. Everyone just accepted that as a given fact, there was 
no criticism. [O01]
Our findings suggest that these coping strategies of risk communication, and 
particularly the emphasis on limitations of forensic genetics’ capacity to deliver 
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unquestionable evidence, is not yet mainstream among forensic geneticists. It 
is, however, perceived as a reasonable approach to render the all-too-easily 
black-boxed aspects of uncertainty accompanying statistical interpretation 
of DNA evidence more explicit and visible (Amorim 2012; Biedermann et al. 
2017). One way of stabilising the field of forensic genetics against criticism and 
keeping its authority is thus presented as the use of its own understanding of 
DNA evidence, with all its limitations made explicit, while delegating respon-
sibility for binary decisions to other members of the criminal justice system.
11.5.3 Communicating and mobilising a forensic 
genetics’ understanding of DNA evidence
While the previously described coping strategies of forensic genetics mainly 
address how forensic geneticists redefine their self-conception and presen-
tation of forensic genetics, this section explores how imaginaries of publics 
impact upon actual communication experiences with members of the criminal 
justice system. Most of the venues and material structures for communicat-
ing forensic genetics to publics-in-particular are pre-formatted by the criminal 
investigation and judicial settings. These routine practices entail, for instance, 
the production of written reports and the provision of expert testimony in 
courts at the request of judges or lawyers. Nevertheless, some forensic geneti-
cists also use alternative spaces and formats to respond to what they perceive 
as being the needs of publics, for instance the need to clearly understand the 
potential and limitations of DNA evidence.
Based on the premise that members of the criminal justice system are not 
properly informed about forensic genetics and DNA evidence, many of our 
interviewees claim that there is a need for training designed to fill knowledge 
gaps, as the following quotation illustrates:
The investigators are often not the people who do the work in the laboratory and 
they may not have learned the same kind of knowledge. So, one of the problems 
is the collection of samples, for example, doing this properly. So there needs to 
be an educational program, which makes sure that everybody is aware of what 
they should be doing. [Q01]
By attempting to construct a shared knowledge base about DNA analysis, 
forensic geneticists take on the role of public educators. In doing so, they 
are therefore delineating hierarchies of knowledge, attempting to assure their 
epistemic authority (i.e., their role as experts), protecting the autonomy of 
forensic genetics, and creating new forms of scientific legitimation and con-
solidation of expertise claims (Gieryn 1983; Kruse 2016).
The narratives of most of the forensic geneticists we interviewed highlighted 
the belief that, by occasionally engaging with members of the criminal justice 
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system through educational courses and direct interactions – at least in more 
exceptional criminal cases, they might reduce the overall risk of potential mis-
interpretation of certain DNA evidence. This is illustrated by the following 
quotation:
I think it is important to educate the police officers about your own work. … We 
are doing it because we are offering educational workshops, trainings, where we 
invite police to give them an update about our work. … Normally [when] we are 
involved in a major case, like a capital crime, then we have direct contact with … 
police officers. They like this very much because they can come to our institute 
and then we can discuss the case, and we can demonstrate what we have found 
and what it means. [O01]
When addressing publics-in-particular, forensic geneticists thus occasion-
ally attempt to actively engage them in training, education, and joint dis-
cussion. Such moments enrich forensic geneticists’ imaginaries of their 
publics by giving them access to the needs of publics-in-particular, as articu-
lated by those publics themselves. They further provide an opportunity to 
actively share forensic geneticists’ understanding of DNA evidence, thereby 
somewhat (re)distributing responsibility for (correctly) interpreting DNA 
evidence.
However, the willingness of forensic geneticists to engage directly with 
their publics-in-particular remains limited. Entertainment media is gener-
ally understood as limiting their capacity to reach out to wider publics and 
to influence exaggerated views about the potential of DNA technologies. In 
this sense, although forensic geneticists acknowledge the need to provide 
education and information, some may in fact contribute to the power of the 
CSI effect by overlooking the influence of their own claims to shape public 
opinion. Feeling unable to compete with media impact on audiences, some 
forensic geneticists end up demonstrating a certain resignation about chal-
lenging dominant perceptions:
And we need to make improvements, and all roads lead to education and infor-
mation. I worry about living in a world where everything is part of the news, 
not a world where we value education, instead everything becomes breaking 
news, everything ends up on newspapers or television. It’s all CSI. But where’s the  
education? [C05]
Beyond communication experiences with members of the criminal justice 
system, publics-in-general are, at least to a certain extent, perceived as being 
‘out of reach’: ‘We are interested in public perception, but it is not as impor-
tant to us as police perception’ [C04]. Consequently, forensic geneticists tend 
to give priority to communication with their publics-in-particular, who are in 
principle the greater threat to the credibility of forensic genetics.
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11.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has addressed the particularities of communicating forensic 
genetics and shown how forensic geneticists respond to these particularities. 
It has also elaborated on forensic geneticists’ imaginaries of public audiences, 
and how these imaginaries shape their experiences of communication.
Forensic geneticists feel that the conditions under which they communi-
cate DNA evidence in the criminal justice system are shaped by widely shared 
media representations of the capacities of DNA technologies. These represen-
tations are understood as being beyond their control, producing considerable 
‘misconceptions’ among both publics-in-particular and publics-in-general. 
Consequently, confronted with what they describe as overly ‘enthusiastic 
publics’, communication of forensic genetics is frequently framed by a deficit 
model approach. Forensic geneticists’ imaginaries of their publics-in-particular – 
judges, the police, or jury members – not only highlight their lack of knowl-
edge, but also construct them as a potential threat to forensic expertise. Public 
misunderstanding of the nature of DNA evidence is framed as potentially put-
ting into jeopardy both the credibility of forensic genetics and, ultimately, the 
ability of the criminal justice system to deliver justice.
As we have described, forensic geneticists develop coping strategies to man-
age these challenges. They emphasise the need to communicate the limitations 
of forensic genetics, and particularly the potential risks and uncertainties in 
the interpretation of quantitative probabilistic frameworks for forensic DNA 
analysis. They also point to the fact that interpretation frameworks can differ 
substantially: binary conventions of interpretation inherent in the criminal 
justice system are very different from the interpretation principles prevalent 
among forensic geneticists. Importantly, forensic geneticists work to (re)align 
the distribution of responsibility for the interpretation of DNA evidence. 
While they suggest that it is the responsibility of (good) forensic geneticists to 
highlight the contingencies of DNA evidence, and that of other parts of the 
criminal justice system to make final judgements concerning justice, they also 
propose educational initiatives for their publics-in-particular. Again, work is 
done here to outline the boundaries between the practices of forensic geneti-
cists and members of the criminal justice system in the interpretation of DNA 
evidence and judicial decision making.
This case thus offers us an unusual approach to science communication: that 
of stressing science’s limitations. This invites us to apply the deficit model in a 
new way. Studying the communication of forensic genetics means investigat-
ing a case in which the deficit not only applies to publics, but is applied by 
scientists to science itself (and other scientists). This emphasis on deficiencies 
becomes constitutive of a communication strategy for responding to what is 
perceived by the science community as ‘too enthusiastic publics’. As such, 
this case study might reveal insights relevant to other situations where pub-
lics may be too ‘enthusiastic’, for instance in the context of ‘breakthrough’ 
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medical knowledge, or space science imagined as realising utopian dreams of 
life beyond the Earth.
While the deficit model of publics is instrumental in the sense that it serves 
as a justification to argue for increasing scientific literacy or for excluding 
lay publics from some types of decision making, the deficit model, as it is 
here applied to science, serves as a gateway to renegotiate responsibilities for 
the non-trustworthy and illegitimate use of scientific findings. In the case 
of forensic genetics, the misuse of scientific findings may turn into miscar-
riages of justice. Therefore, when forensic geneticists emphasise the need to 
take the process of appropriately interpreting scientific results for criminal 
investigation purposes or judicial decisions seriously, at the same time they 
underline the fact that the responsibility to interpret all evidence so as to 
reach decisions – about investigative strategies, or about guilt or innocence – 
lies beyond the boundaries of the responsibility of forensic geneticists.
Forensic geneticists thus aim to renegotiate the meanings of forensic genet-
ics that circulate in the courtroom and beyond. They seek to deconstruct the 
notions about DNA technologies conveyed by the media and to clarify the 
contingencies of DNA evidence. Forensic geneticists reaffirm what has been 
called the ‘CSI effect’ in relation to publics-in-particular present in the court-
room. Yet interestingly, the reference to ‘the CSI effect’ barely even refers to 
the television programme anymore. Instead, it has become a sense-making 
category for forensic geneticists to delineate any understanding of DNA evi-
dence that is different from their own – and thereby a tool to create a unified 
identity for forensic geneticists.
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